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RESPONDENT DR. DAVID OKUBO'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the

District Court's Order of Dismissal on the basis that petitioners
failed to establish a prima facia case that Dr. Okubo's conduct was
a proximate cause of the decedent's injury.
JURISDICTION OF THE COllRT
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(5), this court has
jurisdiction to review the Utah Court of Appeals' decision filed on
March 28, 1990.

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
The provisions which control the resolution of whether
petitioner's writ should be granted are Rules 45, 46, 47, and 49 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Action.
Dr. Okubo hereby incorporates by reference Dr. Nickolfs

description of the "Nature of the Action" found on p. 2 & 3 of Dr.
Nickol's brief. Like counsel for Dr. Nickol, counsel for Dr. Okubo
received petitioners1 Writ of Certiorari on June 5, 1990.

The

petition was unsigned and the certificate of service was neither
dated nor signed.
B.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Plaintiff, Tiffany Ruth Butterfield ("Tiffany"), was

born June 30, 1984.

Defendant David Okubo ("Dr. Okubo") examined

Tiffany as part of a routine pediatric assessment shortly following
her birth. At the time of the examination, Tiffany was healthy and
normal and did not exhibit any abnormal breathing patterns.
2. On July 4, four days after her birth, Tiffany was taken
to the Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital Emergency Clinic.

The

emergency chart, recorded at the time of that visit, indicated that
Tiffany

was

experiencing

decreased

activity

accompanied

with

congestion in the nose which was improved with bulb suctioning.
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Defendant Thomas Nickol ("Dr. Nickol") examined plaintiff at that
time and again assessed the child as normal..
3.

Tiffany's first and only visit to Dr. Okubo's office

occurred on July 16, 1984.

(Deposition of Angela Butterfield, at

fH 20, 23 and 24, attached as Addendum "A". See also Transcript of
December 23, 1987 hearing, p. 7, line 9.)
4. During the July 16 visit, Dr. Okubo obtained a history
from Mrs. Butterfield and examined the child.

His office notes

indicate that Tiffany had some history of "gasps" without any skin
discoloration or reflux.

Dr. Okubofs notes also indicate that

Tiffany had an active, demanding temperament.

Tiffany did not

exhibit any "gasps" during her visit with Dr. Okubo.
5.

The Butterfields

sought

the

services

physician following the July 16 visit with Dr. Okubo.

of another
Dr. Okubo

never saw Tiffany again and never conferred with the Butterfields
after the July 16 visit.

See Transcript of December 23, 1987

hearing, p. 7, line 11. The Butterfields ha^d decided shortly after
the July 16 visit that Dr. Okubo would jio longer be Tiffany's
pediatrician.
6.

(Addendum "A".)

One month after the July 16 visit, on August 16, 1984,

Tiffany was again taken to the emergency room of Jordan Valley
Hospital.

She was again examined by Dr. Nickol. The Butterfields

reported to Dr. Nickol that Tiffany was experiencing an irregular

-3-

breathing pattern with one occasion on which Tiffany did not
breathe for four seconds, although no skin discoloration was noted
on that occasion.

(See Addendum "B" of Nickol Brief.)

Dr. Nickol

assessed the child as normal for her age and suggested to the
parents

that

they watch

the child

carefully

to observe

any

increased respiratory distress with cyanosis or blue discoloration.
Dr. Nickol suggested to the Butterfields that Tiffany be taken back
to Dr. Okubo in the latter part of August or September for a twomonth checkup.

The Butterfields did not go back to Dr. Okubo.

7. On August 31, 1984, the Butterfields took plaintiff to
Dr. Monty McClellan ("Dr. McClellan11), a family practitioner, for
a routine checkup.

Dr. McClellan again saw Tiffany on September

27, November 5, November 30, and December 14, 1984. (Deposition of
Monty McClellan, ItH 7-11, attached hereto as Addendum "B".)
8.

On December 20, Tiffany died from sudden infant death

syndrome while at home. From the time of Dr. Okubofs last contact
with Tiffany on July 16 and her death on December 20, over five
months had elapsed.
9.

On December 10, 1987, Dr. Okubo moved for summary

judgment against plaintiffs.

(R. Hit 166-125.)

On January 27,

1988, the trial court granted Dr. Okubo1s summary judgment motion,
as well

as the summary

judgment motions

filed by the other

defendants, ruling, inter alia, that the Butterfields had not
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established, through competent testimony, that the acts of the
defendants were the proximate cause of Tiffany's death.

(R. fH

206-206.)
10.

On January 26, 1990, the Utah Court of Appeals heard

oral argument on petitioners appeal from the lower court•s order
granting summary judgment.

The court affirmed the lower court's

decision on March 28, 1990.
A R G U M E N T
POINT I

PETITIONERS' PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
IS UNTIMELY AND SHOULD BE DENIED
Dr. Nickol already argues in his opposition brief that the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied because it was
filed in violation of this court's order granting petitioner's
Motion for Enlargement of Time and requiring that the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari be filed on May 28, 1990.

Dr. Okubo hereby

incorporates by reference Point I of Dr. Nickol's brief (p. 8 and
9) as if fully set forth herein.
POINT II
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER
OF DISMISSAL ON THE BASIS THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO ESTABLISH
THAT DR. OKUBO'S CONDUCT PROXIMATELY CAUSED TIFFANY BUTTERFIELD'S
DEATH, GIVEN THE FIVE MONTH INTERVAL BETWEEN DR. OKUBO'S
LAST CONTACT WITH TIFFANY AND THE FACT THAT ANOTHER PHYSICIAN
HAD ASSUMED THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HER CARE

-5-

Introduction
Dr. Okubo hereby incorporates by reference the entirety of
"Point III" of Dr. Nickolfs brief in opposition to the Petition for
Certiorari, p. 11-16.
proximate

causation

Dr. Nickol offers much explanation of the
issue which

is proper

and correct.

The

following portion of Dr. Okubofs brief is intended to supplement
the analysis found in Point III in Dr. Nickol!s brief.

Dr. Okubo

sufficiently raised the issue of proximate causation at the trial
level for reasons quite similar to those set forth in the Nickol
brief - the affidavit of Dr. Okubofs own expert, Dr. Dennis W.
Nielson, presented

the trial court with

facts upon which to

conclude that the Butterfields had not sufficiently alleged the
proximate causation.

(Dr. Nielson1s Affidavit is attached as

Addendum "C".)
A.

Dr. Jacobs Failed to Allege Specific Facts to
Support his Allegation of Proximate Causation.

Counsel for Dr. Okubo has been unable to find a medical
malpractice

case

from

any

jurisdiction

where

a

plaintiff

successfully resisted a motion for summary judgment by submitting
an opposing affidavit which makes only a conclusory allegation of
proximate causation without specific facts or competent proof.
In Utah, affidavits which seek to resist motions for
summary judgment must state specific facts.
stated as follows:
-6-

The requirement is

When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by
affidavit or otherwise provided in this rule, must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.
If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall
be entered against him. [Emphasis added.]
Rule

56(e),

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure.

An

identical

the

affiant's

requirement is found in almost all jurisdictions.
An

affidavit

which

merely

reflects

unsubstantiated conclusions and which fails to state evidentiary
facts is insufficient to create an issue of fact. Webster v. Sill,
675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983);

Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation

Corp., 508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973).
Not only must a medical malpractice plaintiff show a breach
of the applicable standard of care with "specific facts", he must
also set forth proximate causation with "specific facts" in order
to defeat a motion for summary judgment.

While the Court of

Appeals found that Dr. Jacobs1 affidavit does sufficiently allege
a breach of the applicable standard of care, it found that the
affidavit does not allege with specific facts a proximate causal
connection between Dr. Okubofs conduct and Tiffany Butterfield's
death.

That finding is correct.

The affidavit does not even

attempt to allege, let alone explain with specific facts, that Dr.
Okubo's conduct, during a well baby visit when Tiffany was not

-7-

experiencing breathing problems, "caused" Tiffany's death.
Perhaps

the best Utah

case

to directly

confront

the

"specific facts" requirement as it pertains to proximate causation
is Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985).
There, dependents of a hotel guest who was murdered in his room
brought an action for wrongful death against the hotel, alleging
that the hotel was negligent in providing adequate hotel security.
This court accepted the proposition in Mitchell that the plaintiffs
had

"ellicited

sufficient

evidence

through

the

published

depositions to raise material issues of fact with respect to
whether the defendants were negligent in providing adequate hotel
security."

Id.

at

245.

Despite

overwhelming

evidence

of

negligence, this court nevertheless affirmed summary judgment for
the hotel because of the plaintifffs

failure to establish a

proximate causal connection between the hotel's negligence and the
decedent's death:
It was plaintiff's burden to show the
defendant's conduct was a substantial causative
factor that lead to Mitchell's death. The fact
that the instrumentality which produced the injury
and subsequent death was the criminal conduct of
the third person would not preclude a finding of
proximate cause if the intervening agency was
itself a foreseeable act.
* * *

However, in this case there is no direct
evidence linking Mitchell's death with the alleged
inadequate security measures at the Hilton. There
-8-

is no direct evidence of any kind as to how or
where the murderer first encountered Mitchell.
Similarly, there is no direct evidence as to how
the murderer entered Mitchellfs room or whether he
had a prior relationship with Mitchell.
* * *

Any supposition, therefore, as to the
manner of entrance to Mitchellf$ room or the
identity of the assailant would be totally
speculative. A jury cannot be permitted to engage
in such speculation.
Id. at 246.
The application of Mitchell to thiis case is clear.

There

is no direct evidence in Dr. Jacob's affidavit, or anywhere else,
to suggest how Dr. Okubofs

treatment

of Tiffany

resulted in her death over five months later.

Butterfield

To permit the

petitioners to go to trial with the suggestion that Dr. Okubo may
have contributed to the petitioner's injury would be to invite
precisely the speculation warned against ift Mitchell.
It is not inherently inconsistent for the Court of Appeals
to conclude that Dr. Jacobs1 affidavit may adequately allege that
Dr. Okubo breached the applicable standard of care and, at the same
time, to find that the affidavit lacks specific facts to establish
proximate cause.
P.2d

1078

In Bennion v. LeGrand-Johnson Const. Co., 701

(Utah 1985), buyers brought

an action against the

supplier of some allegedly defective concrete. The jury found for
the plaintiff.

They agreed in response to one interrogatory that

-9-

the plaintiffs themselves were "negligent", but found that their
negligence was not a "proximate cause" of their damages.

The

Supreme Court concluded, on appeal, that there is no inherent
inconsistency in a finding that a party is both negligent but not
the "proximate cause" of an injury:
Proximate cause is a legal construct calling for a
legal conclusion based on various factors in
addition to an actual cause-effect relationship.
It is commonplace in the law that an act,
omission, or force may be an actual cciuse, but not
a proximate cause. Since the jury may well have
so found, we cannot conclude that there is an
irreconcilable inconsistency.
Id. at 1083.
In Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah
App. 1988), the Utah Court of Appeals reasserted the principal that
a medical malpractice plaintiff may not successfully resist a
motion for summary judgment without competent, specific evidence to
oppose the motion.

The court affirmed summary judgment for a

physician after finding that the physician could not be held liable
for the negligent

treatment

of

a patient.

The patient had

developed a skin disorder as a result of medications prescribed by
the physician for epileptic seizures.

The court found that there

was no sworn evidentiary material to controvert the defendant's
expert opinion that his treatment of the patient, including his
choice medications

and dosages, complied

standard of care.
-10-

with the

applicable

Reeves is a significant case because the Court of Appeals
reversed summary judgment for the pharmaceutical manufacturers concluding,

in essence, that the manufacturers may have been

negligent, but that a doctor who prescribes their drugs, without
knowledge of the danger, will not be negligent. In a sense, Reeves
is

the

opposite

of

this

case.

causation

established to resist summary judgment.

was

sufficiently

Breach of the applicable

standard of care for the physician in question was not established.
Reeves illustrates the importance of finding both principals.
B.

The Great Majority of Jurisdictions Would
Uphold the Court of Appeals.

Most courts would agree with the Court of Appeals that a
dismissal of the petitioners1

case was proper based on their

failure to establish that Dr. Okubo's conduct proximately caused
their injury.

It is entirely appropriate to prevent a medical

malpractice plaintiff from presenting his case to a jury where
there is inadequate proof that the defendant physician's conduct
proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.

Harvey v. Fridley

Medical Center, P.A., 315 N.W.2d 225 (Minn. 1982).

In Harvey, the

Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a directed verdict for a physician
based on the plaintiff's failure to prove proximate causation. The
plaintiff had presented himself to the defendant surgeon for the
removal of a foreign object in his shoulder, the existence of which
had been confirmed by x-rays. The surgeon failed to examine the x-11-

rays before commencing surgery and was unable to locate the object.
Several months later, a different surgeon located the object (a
shard of glass) and removed it.

Notwithstanding the fact that a

physician had expressed the opinion that a surgeon exercising due
care would review x-rays before proceeding with surgery, the
Minnesota Court upheld a directed verdict in favor of the surgeon.
The court based its conclusion on that fact that the plaintiff had
presented inadequate proof of proximate causation because he had
failed to prove that an analysis of the x-ray would have guaranteed
the success of the initial operation.
It

is particularly

appropriate

to prevent

a medical

malpractice action from going to a jury where, as here, the
proximate causation question is clouded by the fact that the
defendant physician could not foresee the negligence of other
physicians who subsequently treat the plaintiff.

Thompson v.

Presbyterian Hosp., Inc. 652 P.2d 260 (Okl. 1982).

In Thompson,

the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against, among
others, a surgeon and an anesthesiologist for injuries his wife
received as a result of the administration of anesthesia. Prior to
surgery, the surgeon had consented to the administration of Demerol
to

the

plaintiff's

decedent.

Later,

the

administered a "saddle block" spinal anesthetic.

anesthesiologist
The plaintiff's

theory was that his decedent suffered damages as a result of the
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synergistic effect of the combined administration of Demerol and
the saddle block, complicated by the anesthesiologist's failure to
properly monitor the decedent during the surgery.
The trial court sustained a demurer interposed by the
surgeon. The Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the
decedent's

injuries

supervening

could

negligence

of

not

have

the

happened

except

anesthesiologist.

for the

The

court

acknowledged that there was testimony by the plaintiff's medical
expert that the surgeon's act of prescribing Demerol prior to
surgery was a deviation from the applicable standard of care.
Nevertheless, the Thompson court focused on the absence of a
proximate

causal

link between

the

surgeon's

actions

decendent's inj ury:
Negligence is not actionable unless it proximately
caused the harm for which liability is sought to
be imposed. Failure to establish that defendant's
[the surgeons'] negligence was the proximate cause
of the harmful event is fatal to the plaintiff's
claim.
* * *

It would be indeed an invasion of the province
of the court to allow Dr. G.'s [plaintiff's
expert] opinion to pre-empt the proximate cause
question simply because he believed there was a
causal link between the surgeon's act of
prescribing Demerol and the injury sustained. It
is the court's duty to determine as a matter of
law whether the evidence is sufficient to show a
causal connection or whether the intervening
factors adduced by the proof did break the causal
nexus between the surgeon's actions and the
-13-

and the

resulting injury.
Dr. G.'s opinion cannot
dispense with the plaintiff's legal duty to
establish not only that the Demerol prescription
was, under the circumstances, a breach of accepted
medical standards, but also that the patient's
injurious episode of hypoxia encephalopathy was
reasonably foreseeable from the surgeon's act of
prescribing the Demerol.
The record is barren of proof to the effect that
the surgeon could [have] reasonably anticipated
the synergistic effect of Demerol in combination
with the saddle block would repress the patient's
breathing.
Id. at 263-64 (citations omitted, emphasis in original).
Thompson strongly suggests that the Court of Appeals should
be affirmed. Although Dr. Jacobs opines in a very non-specific way
that Dr. Okubo's care fell below the applicable standards, he fails
to offer any specific facts to even suggest how that deviation can
be considered the proximate cause of Tiffany's death five months
later after five subsequent consultations with Dr. McClellan. The
absence of proximate causation is particularly obvious when it is
recalled that Dr. Okubo was only consulted at Tiffany's birth, when
there was no evidence of breathing problems, and again two weeks
later. During that interval, Tiffany had been taken to Dr. Nickol
for breathing problems. When Dr. Okubo saw the child on the second
time, however, it was for a routine check-up and Dr. Okubo was
never able to observe the breathing problems directly.

Even if

Tiffany's death was a result of someone's failure to prescribe a
home apnea monitor to guard against SIDS, it could not have been
-14-

foreseeable to Dr. Okubo on any of his contacts with the child that
a home apnea monitor would be necessary.
Thompson

could not

foresee

Just as the surgeon in

the subsequent

negligence

of the

anesthegiologist, Dr. Okubo could not foresee that the Butterfields
would take their child to another physiciah, preventing Dr. Okubo
from making an ongoing analysis of Tiffany's breathing problems.
Finally, even assuming that Tiffany might h£ve been saved by a home
apnea monitor and that the standard of care at the time of her
death required a treating physician to provide one, Dr. Okubo could
not foresee that Dr. McClellan would fail to recommend one during
the course of his four month treatment of Tiffany.
Other jurisdictions have holdings ^imilar to Thompson. In
Alabama, the rule in medical malpractice cases is that to find
liability, "there must be more than a mere possibility, or one
possibility among others, that the negligence complained of caused
the injury; there must be evidence that tfhe negligence probably
caused the injury."

Williams v. Bhoopathi, 474 So.2d 690 (Ala.

1985) (upholding a directed verdict for a physician in a case
arising out of the stillborn birth of a child). In Connecticut, a
medical malpractice plaintiff must prove not only a violation of
the standard of care, but must also prove a causal relationship
between the violation and the resulting injury.
State Tulin, 365 A.2d 1076 (Conn. 1976).

-15-

Grodie v. The

fhe malpractice must be

more than a mere incident in a chain of events:
If the chain of causation of the damage, when
traced from the beginning to the end, includes an
act or omission which, even if wrongful or
negligent, is or becomes of no consequence in the
results or so trivial as to be a mere incident of
the operating cause, it is not such a factor as
will impose liability for those results. Id. at
1079. (Citation omitted, emphasis added.)
For a similar holding, see Fitzgerald v. Manning, 679 F.2d
341 (4th Cir. 1982).

In Fitzgerald, a medical malpractice action,

the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the causation
requirement

in

medical

malpractice

actions

in

Virginia

is

characterized by a "but for" rule under which the proximate cause
of

an event

is that

act or omission which,

in natural and

continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
produces an event, and without which the event would not have
occurred. Both cause in fact and foreseeability of the injury must
be present.

In a medical malpractice action where there are a

number of possible causes for the plaintiff's injury, a physician's
negligence will be regarded as a proximate cause only if the
evidence is that it is more likely or probable that his negligence
caused injury than the other possible causes.

Certainly, the

conduct of Dr. Okubo is not, more probably, the cause of Tiffany's
death than the other possible causes.
C.

The United States Supreme Court Has made it
Clear That Courts Should Not Strain to Defeat
Motions for Summary Judgment Where Questions with
-16-

Respect to a Material Fact Are Not Reasonable.
It is useful to recall that the United States Supreme Court
has recently held that summary judgment is not to be regarded as a
stepchild of the law:
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded
not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but
rather as an integral part of the federal rules as
a whole, which are designed "to secure the just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action."
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed. 2d
265 at 276 (1986).
The court in Celotex went on to note:
Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only
for the rights of the persons asserting claims and
defenses that are adequately based in fact to have
those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but
also for the rights of persons opposing such
claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner
provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the
claims and defenses have no factual basis.
Id. at 276.
This court is undoubtedly cognizant of the Butterfields1
interest in a jury trial as it considers this Petition for Writ of
Certiorari.

Celotex teaches that the court must also be cognizant

of Dr. Okubo's interest in resolving a claim which really should
not go to the jury. The Butterfields had several months to obtain
competent, clear, unequivocal medical testimony that Dr. Okubo
breached the applicable standard of care and that that breach
proximately caused Tiffany's death.
-17-

They failed to marshall the

requisite

evidence

to resist

Dr. Okubo!s

motion

for

summary

judgment, even after obtaining an extension of time to do so.
There is no reason to think that the Butterfields have not already
"taken their best

shot" at resisting

the motion

for summary

judgment, and it would be unfair to force Dr. Okubo to try his case
to the jury on the slim hope that the Butterfields could improve
the caliber of their expert testimony between now and the time of
trial.

The Butterfields had their day for preparation and the

Jacobs affidavit was the best they could do.
It is entirely proper for this court to consider the
ultimate plausibility of the Butterfield1s theory against Dr. Okubo
when ruling on this motion.

Concededly, it is inappropriate for a

court to resolve factual inferences in favor of one party or
another when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, but when a
claim is thoroughly implausible, such as the notion of Dr. Okubofs
treatment of Tiffany five months before her death contributed to
her

death,

the

court

may

properly

take

notice

of

such

implausibility in the factual context of the Butterfield1s claim.
In a decision handed down in the same year as Celotex, the United
States Supreme Court stated:
When the moving party has carried its burden under
Ruled 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply
show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts. In the language of the rule,
the non-moving party must come forward with
"specific facts showing that there is a genuine
-18-

issue for trial." Where the recbrd taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the non-moving party, there is no
"genuine issue for trial."
It follows from these settled principles that if
the factual context renders respondents1 claim
implausible—if the claim is one which simply
makes no economic sense—respondents must come
forward with more persuasive evidence to support
their claim than would otherwise be necessary.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 at 552 (1986) ("emphasis in
original).
The suggestion that Dr. Okubo should have to endure a jury
trial "makes no sense", and Matsushita entitles this court to
consider that fact.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals1 conclusion th^t Dr. Jacobs1 affidavit
fails to offer

"specific

facts" to prove a proximate causal

connection between Dr. Okubo's conduct and Tiffany Butterfield's
death was correct.

The decision should be upheld.

DATED this *p day of July, 1990.
STRONG & HANNI

R. scott willlefiis
G. Eric Nielson

7009
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ADDENDUM "A"

23
Q

It was never raised by ydu?

A

No, because I was told at the hospital she was

developing a breathing pattern and they made me feel like such
a fool for taking her in there wheh she quit breathing, that I
thought I was being foolish to even ask about it.
Q

Did Dr. Okubo ever raise the subject with you of

A

No,

Q

Did you tell him of the incident that occurred on

SIDS?

July 4?
A
hospital.
Q

He was aware of it.

They called him from the

I called him the next d^y, also.
But did you, at this visit on the 16th, did you

actually tell him about what had happened?
A

Yes*

We discussed it shortly.

I mostly discussed

it with the nurse.
Q

What did he tell you he Relieved the problem was?

A

She was creating a breathing pattern.

Q

And not to worry about itt?

A

Not to worry.

Q

Was that the end of the conversation?

A

Yes.

Q

Have you seen him since that date?

A

July 16?

Q

July 16.

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

24
1

A

No, I haven1t.

2

Q

You didn't take her back in to see him again at all,

4

A

No..

5

Q

Why not?

6

A

Because I felt he was careless.

7

Q

What caused you to feel that he was careless?

8

A

Because I was in one door and out the other.

3

9

then?

was two doors on the examining room and they ushered you in

10

one room and out the other, like ai^ assembly line.

11

I felt.

12 I
13

There

Q

That's how

So you made a conscious decision at that time not to

go back and see him?

14

A

Yes, I was going to look for another physician.

15

Q

And did you?

16

A

I found one —

17

yeah, I looked and I found another -

physician at the end of August.

18

Q

Who was that?

19

A

Dr. McClellan.

20

Q

I guess 'the next date th^t really comes up with

21

regard to July is the July 4 incident; is that correct?

22

said that you told Dr. Okubo about the breathing problem on

23

July 4?

24

A

Yes.

25

Q

Tell us what happened on July 4.

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

You

ADDENDUM "B"

1
2

I understand that you! did see Tiffany Butter field.

&

You are referring to your office records now, I assume.

3

A.

Yes, I am.

4

ft

Could you tell me wheh you first saw her?

5

A.

I first saw her on August the 31st, 1984.

6

ft

When you saw her, did her mother give you any

7

kind of h istory?

8

A.

Normally you always t^ke a history.

9

ft

Can you tell me, then J what history you were

10
11

provided with at that time?
That she was a normal birth, seven pounds,

A-

12

eighteen and a half-inch baby, t hat had no difficulty

13

with pregnancy, that the chief domplaint at that time

14

was she had a rash, or she had a whitish material on

15

the inside of her mouth, and that was a thrush and that

16

was treated.

17

ft

18

Did she mention at thi£ time any apnea or problems

with breathing?

19

A.

No.

20

ft

Did she mention any problems at all besides

21,

the rash?

22

A.

No.

23

ft

Did you then schedule just a routine follow

24
25

up or did she call the next time she was to visit you?

A.

I would have normally scheduled a follow up.

7.
M

l

.

••

II

.

1

1

1

• 1

•

. 1 1

1

1

1

1

|

.

1

1

.

i

1

I don't recall whether I asked her to return specifically

2

or whether that was her own i£ea, but I normally would

3

have asked her to come back aid then to start her

4

immunization schedule.

5
6

Q.

of listlessness?

7
8

Did she report on this first visit any complaint

A.
ft

No.
In Tiffany?

9

k

No.

10

0

Or congestion?

11

k

12

Q.

What were your impressions, if you can remember?

13

A.

Just that she was a healthy baby and she had

14

oral thrush.

15

Q.

16
17

No.

When you saw her the next time, can you tell

us the date and what your findings were.
A.

It was 9-27-84.

Basically it was the same

18

thing, it was

normal well baby examination.

Her head,

19

ears, nose, eyes and throat wede within normal limits.
I

20

Fontanel

21

infection, intraorally was recovering with the microstatin

22

I had given her.

23

No abdominal masses, umbilicus Was healed.

24

no hip click.

25

were given that day and she was scheduled for return

was normal, the tear ducts were open, the yeast

Her chest was clear, normal sinus rhythm.

Feet were normal.

No hernia,

DPT and oral polio

8.

at two months.
Q.

At this time was it y^ur understanding that

you were this child's primary physician?
A.

As far as I knew,

Q.

Was it your understanding that she was seeing

you exclusively or did you know whether she was seeing
other physicians, or did you know either way?
A.

I don't recall, honestly.

Q.

Do you recall on this second office visit having

any discussions regarding apnea* congestion?
A.

She didn't relate that the child was having

any difficulties like that.
Q.

I won't go into the specific office visits.

I also have a copy of your records but I did want to
ask you a couple of questions at}out it.
Were you also seeing the mother at this time
as a patient?
A.

Yes, I believe I was.

Q.

Do you recall seeing Wer in the emergency room

during the same* period of time?
A.

It would have been abolut the same period of

time but I don't have my records in front of me.

I can't

tell you exactly which date.
Q.

You don't have the recbrds for the mother?

A.

Well, that wasn't what we were supposed to

9.

1

talk about today.

2

and s o —

I thought it was just about Tiffany

3

Q.

Those are the only records you have?

4

A.

I could get them but, I haven't reviewed them

5
6
7

op anything like that s o —
Q.

We will stick with Tiffany just to stay sequential)

then, and then we could talk about the mother more later.

8

A.

Okay.

9

(J

So your understanding, then, you saw the child

10

six times; is that correct?

11

A.

Actually I believe I saw the child—

T2

Q.

Five.

13

A.

Five times.

14

Q.

Because the December 22nd visit was just with

15

the mother?

16

A.

Yes, it was.

17

Q.

And during these fivQ visits from August until

Excuse me.

18

December, did the mother mention anything to you about

19

problems with breathing, or problems with congestion,

20

or listlessness, discoloration; any of those things?

21

A.

Yes, on one occasion.

I'm sorry.

Two occasions

22

She told me on November the 5th that the child had been

23

having some mucus in her nose and that was treated.

24
25

I thought she had a berous otitis media
when I saw her back on the 30th

and

that had resolved.

10.

1

I did see her again oh the 14th of December

2

and she related that the child had mucus in her upper

3

respiratory tract.

4

so I reinstituted it, and then t did not see her after

5

that.

6
7

Q.

The previous treatment had been effective

Could you tell me frotti your notes

what was the previous treatment?

The Rondec?

8

A.

Rondec, DM.

9

Q.

And so you continued it because—

10

A.

It recurred.

11
12

ft

It recurred.

on the 14th

Because it had resolved it by

the 30th?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

And could you explain to me what SOM is again?

15

A.

Serous otitis media.

16

Q.

And what is that?

17

A.

That is where you have fluid behind the ear

18
19
20
21

but it is not of an infectious nature.
Q.

And was the condition (complained of on the

14th the same thing; SOM, or was it something different?
A.

No.

That was what she had on that one occasion

22

on the 5th of November and on ttife 14th of December that

23

was not present.

24

Q.

And the complaint of the 14th was just—

25

A.

That the mucus was present in her nose.

11

1

than the records?

2

A.

No, sir.

3

Q.

And the information given to you by the parents?

4

A.

No, sir.

5

Q.

Okay.

Let me ask on£ more thing.

6

on this whole deal.

7

witness to testify for Mr. Grihdstaff?
k

8
9

ft

10

matter?

I am hazy

Have you been retained as an expert

Not'that I know of.
Has he asked you to testify in court in this

11

MR. GRINDSTAFF:

12

THE WITNESS:

I have never talked to him.

I have never met him before or talked

13

to him on the phone, and so, no, I have not been retained

14

as an expert in the case.

15
16

Q.

(By Mr. Garner)

And so have the plaintiffs

asked you to testify in their behalf?

17

A.

They asked if I would be willing to do that

18

and I said,

19

for you, and this might be something that is going to

20

be settled out.of court.

21

I will, but letfs not cross bridges before—"

f,

Why don't you see how the case goes along

22

MR. GARNER:

23

MRS. BRENNAN:

I think that is all I have.
I have a couple more.

24
25

If absolutely necessary, yes,

EXAMINATION
BY MRS. BRENNAN:

Q. Are you still seeing Mrs. Butter-

47.
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R. Scott Williams, #3498
STRONG & KAtmi
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Sixth Floor Boston Building
#9 Exchange Place
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Telephone: (801) 532-7080
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DEPUTY CLERK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT QF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo'
ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians
and parents of and on
behalf of TIFFANY RUTH
BUTTERFIELD,

AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS W.
NIELkON, M.D., PH.D.

Plaintiffs,
-vs-

CivifL No.

DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICHOL,
fcnd HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5,

C86-9250

Judg£ Richard Moffatt

Defendants.
oooOooo^
STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
:
)

»-

ss.

Dennis W. Nielson, M.D., Ph.D*, being first duly sworn
On oath deposes and states:

1.

J am a physician

licensed

to practice

in the

of Utah, having a specialty in pediatric medicine.

State

I am

a board certified pediatrician and.am presently an assistant
professor of pediatrics at the Department of Pediatrics at
the University of Utah Medical Center.

Of particular interest

ooooroor

to this case involving a claimed sudden infant death syndrome,
I am board certified in pediatric pulihonology a»d am presently
the director of the Pediatric Pulmonary Function Laboratory
at the University of Utah Hospital and Primary Children's
Medical Center.

I am also a member of the Sudden Infant

Death Advisory Council of the Utah State Department of Health.
A complete summary of my expertise and qualifications is
included within the attached Curriculum Vitae to this affidavit.
2.

At the request of counsel for Dr. David Okubo, I

have reviewed the medical records of the deceased infant,
Tiffany Ruth Butterfield, and the depositions of Albert John
and Angela Butterfield.
3.

That I am familiar with the standard of care required

of a pediatrician for treatment of the symptoms as reported
to Dr. Nickol and Dr. Okubo by the plaintiffs on July 4,
and July 16, 1984.
4.

That after a thorough review of the medical records

and the depositions involved in this case I am of the opinion
that Dr. Okubo did not deviate from the standard of care
required of him in the treatment rendered to the deceased
infant through July 16, 1984.
5.

More specifically, even if Dr. Okubo was told by

Mrs. Butterfield of the incident that allegedly occurred
on July 4, 1984, and that was referred to in her deposition,
I am still of the opinion that Dr. Okiibo would not have been
-2-

0000

required to order or suggest a home mohitor, assuming as
plaintiff has testified that there had only been the one
incident prior to seeing Dr. Okubo and that the child was
breathing normally and appeared healthy when finally presented
to the emergency room on July 4, 1984, and also when presented
to Dr. Okubo on July 16, 1984.

Although some physicians

may choose to order a home monitor for circumstances similar
to what the plaintiffs reported occurred on July 4f 1984,
the standard of care would clearly not have required Dr.
Okubo to order one or refer the patient to another physician
who would do so.
6.

In addition, even if Dr. Okubq had ordered a home

monitor there is insufficient data or literature available
to conclude with medical probability that it would have prevented
this particular infant's death.
Further affiant saith naught.
DATED this lQ1^ day of December, 11987.

4^wvp LAJ f

(uJh***

Dennis W. N i e l s o n , M.D., Ph.D.
S u b s c r i b e d and sworn t o b e f o r e me t h i s

lQth

day of December,

1987.

Notary P u b l i c - R e s i d i n g a t :
Leona K. Hollingsworth / /
Bountiful, pT
v/
My Commission Expires:
April 25. 1991.
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Attorney for Plaintiffs
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David W. Slagle, Esq.
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Attorneys for Defendant Holy
Cross Jordan Valley Hospital
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P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Gary D. Stott, Esq.
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson
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50 South Main Street, #700
P. 0. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
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